Chapter 1
In this chapter, Citino makes it clear that in 1942, when the United States entered World War II, the US was strategically backward, especially in sharp contrast to the Germans. The United States positioned infantry first, then tanks behind; the author said the USA was stuck in old ways of war strategy. This was the mindset the US Army entered Morocco with in November 1942 when fighting the Germans. Although the Germans lost, it was largely due to an underplanned battle in Morocco. Additionally, the first US Army battle in Tunisia was a stalemate against the Germans.
Chapter 2
In this chapter, the author highlights the praise of Erich von Manstein’s genius that has appeared in literature since the 1940s, while the field marshal was still alive. As part of the praise, Citino also showed how Manstein reversed the Wehrmacht horror story in the east after Stalingrad in 1943.
Chapter 3
Citino explains here that the Allied victory in Tunisia was largely due to the abundance of war materials, not that they were better warriors than the Germans. Likewise, the Germans were bound to lose the Tunisian fight; they simply didn’t have the supplies to support the fighting army in that arena.
Chapter 4
In this fourth chapter, the author focuses on the factors that led to the Wehrmacht’s loss in the Battle of Kursk. But first, Citino analyzes that launching the offensive was not entirely Hitler’s decision, as claimed by many modern historians, but rested on the agreement of all senior officers in the Wehrmacht. Additionally, the author debunked the notion that the Battle of Kursk was not the greatest tank battle in history, despite the presence of numerous tanks from both the Germans and the Soviets.
Chapter 5
This chapter delves deeply into the Wehrmacht’s battle in 1943, particularly the Sicilian campaign. The author explains here that the Allies came to chase the Germans out with overwhelming war materials, including men, guns, planes, and so on. But the Germans adopt the blitzkrieg style of battle, not in attacking but in retreating. The author wrote that due to this, it wasn’t a satisfactory victory for the Allies because they couldn’t capture the Germans as POWs.
Chapter 6
The author used this chapter to analyze Manstein’s battles in the east for the second half of 1943. Manstein was on a full retreat, even though he won some battles along the way; however, the Soviets had also advanced in their war operations. It’s also worth noting that for Manstein to retreat, he had Hitler’s blessings, even though the Führer was not happy that he was losing land to Stalin.
Chapter 7
Citino explained here that Field Marshal Kesselring was the only German general in history who willingly fought Stellungskrieg, that is, static warfare. And the reason was also mentioned in this chapter. The author also pointed out that the US Army in Italy in 1943 fought well due to superior firepower, no doubt, but that must never be its only praise in the theater. The fight against the Wehrmacht in Italy was not something the US Army had previously experienced or knew what to expect, so all historians should credit the US Army more than it has received.
Conclusion
The author concludes that the fight the Wehrmacht was fighting in 1943 wasn’t Hitler’s doing but rather a tradition embedded within the organization. Perhaps the German officers thought there was still hope for victory in 1943 and beyond, but history has shown that the Soviets and the Western Allies outnumbered the Germans. The author finalized that the Wehrmacht had picked a fight it could never win.
