About the author
Citino is a German military historian with a specialty in the Second World War. He has published multiple books on the German way of war, which has earned him numerous awards, including the Samuel Elliot Morison Prize in 2021. In his books, he has emphasized that Bewegungskrieg was the proper name for the Wehrmacht’s style of war, not blitzkrieg.
Chapter 1
The author explained that the Wehrmacht got its blitzkrieg tactics from the Prussian army, led by Frederick the Great. In the past, blitzkrieg was referred to as Bewegungskrieg (mobile warfare).
This tactic was best used for short, fast campaigns, and it had to be victorious, simple. Anything that could slow down the battle would result in the war’s defeat.
The author then stressed that all German battles from Poland in 1939 to the Soviet Union in 1941 were won using the Bewegungskrieg tactic, until bad weather and the determination of the Russians halted the Germans. After these setbacks, Germany faced continued losses, eventually leading to defeat in 1945.
Chapter 2
In this second chapter, the author describes how, during the German Crimea campaign, which included the cities of Kerch and Sevastopol, the Germans, again led by Manstein, employed the classic Bewegungskrieg style of war. For the first half of the battle, the fight was largely against the Germans, and the Wehrmacht were later able to win due to the slackening of the Soviet forces.
The author also pointed out that movement warfare was the only style of battle that the Wehrmacht understood, and it’s what they would continue to employ throughout the Second World War. In addition, the victory during the Crimean campaign won Manstein the baton of field marshal.
Chapter 3
In the third chapter, Citino highlighted how the battle for the city of Kharkov unfolded, particularly the operational megalomania that went into its planning from both the Soviet and German perspectives. The Soviet, commanded by General Timoshenko, led the Red Army hand in hand with Stalin’s blessing in Kharkov. As the author described it, it’s a tiny battlefield for such a massive army. The Germans, who seized opportunities quickly, adopted their well-known tactics of maneuvering and encirclement. The Wehrmacht cornered the Soviet army, although, thanks to its massive air bombardment from the Luftwaffe, the author claimed it would have been almost impossible for the Germans to win the war against the Soviet Union flawlessly without it. The Germans captured 240,000 Soviet soldiers in total, but the most painful for the Red Army was its capable commanders who fell into the Germans’ hands. The victory at Kharkov showed the Germans they still had it, so now let’s see how Tobruk is going to fall.
Chapter 4
In this chapter, the author begins by debunking the fantasy myth surrounding Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. Citino then writes that Rommel’s first attempt to take Tobruk was a terrible loss for him and his Afrika Korps, and he retreated hurriedly back to Gazala. It was from Gazala that Rommel launched the classical German style of war, the Bewegungskrieg, and he flattened the British 8th. The author also emphasizes a point throughout this chapter that Rommel was not a special commander; he was simply made the poster boy for the Wehrmacht by the Nazi regime. And the field marshal was dumped after he was of no use.
Chapter 5
This chapter opens with a fact about the weakness of the Wehrmacht that the OKW has totally ignored since the beginning of the war in 1939, namely, the inadequate intelligence reports on the enemy. Until the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 and beyond 1942, the Wehrmacht had yet to resolve this problem. The Germans just want to attack and ignore the surrounding factors that could cause delays and waste of war materials. This inadequacy ultimately cost the Germans Operation Blue, although the author writes that it was not a total loss; however, it was still a significant setback. Since the Wehrmacht hadn’t really captured any of its assigned objectives since the beginning of the war in 1939. The author also notes that the Soviets are now more effective against the Germans and are making better decisions.
Chapter 6
Citino, in this chapter, describes the factors that halt the Middle East campaign for Rommel. He explains that all Rommel knew was to attack; even if he didn’t have the resources, meaning men and adequate ammunition, he’d still attack. This attitude was the mode he employed at El Alamein, where he constantly undermined the Allies’ strength. Rommel attacks when all odds are against his army, and the British are ready for him. It was a paramount loss for Rommel and the Wehrmacht as a whole. The last point the author made was the importance of the Enigma machine that had been in play at this point in the battle. The Germans were completely unaware of this. That is, the Germans were playing right into the Allies’ hands.
Chapter 7
In this chapter, the author examines the cause that halted the German campaign in the Caucasus and Stalingrad. He argues that first, the Germans underestimated the Soviet manpower and planned accordingly. And secondly, there was a shortage of fuel, men, tanks, and planes, and these were all that drove the Germans’ lightning victories at the beginning of the war. Since all these were in short supply, the author stated that there was no way the Germans would be able to fight the Red Army properly. The author also notes that the Red Army now denied the Germans the opportunity for encirclement. Now the Soviets regroup and fight the Germans.
Chapter 8
Citino explains in this chapter that the reason the Germans had been winning battles after battle, both in the south and in the east, was due to their superiority in all war materials. And caught its enemy by surprise and unprepared. The author also pointed out that the first German win, which later turned to a loss beginning in 1942, had been mentioned in their war history in the past, which the war planners had read; they simply wished to ignore history and hoped they’d be different. Rommel lost North Africa woefully, and Hitler’s Sixth Army lost Stalingrad. Both losses and every other German loss had been inevitable, argued Citino. The Wehrmacht was advancing but losing the necessary supplies needed to wage war. The author said it was just a matter of time.
Chapter 9
Citino concludes in the last chapter that the Wehrmacht’s traditional approach to war has been obsolete and not modern at all, as many experts had claimed. He argues that the Bewegungskrieg was the strength and weakness of Hitler’s army. And the weakness finally showed when the Western Allies and the Soviets stood up to the Wehrmacht from 1942 until it crumbled into smithereens in 1945.
